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EQuAL PIIOTECMON AND Tm RACE PROBLEM
... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."1
The problems presented to the lawyer and society by the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are twofold:
(1) The interpretation of the ambiguous ideals contained therein,
essentially a legal problem; and (2) the effect of these interpre-
tations on the peoples involved, essentially a sociological problem.
As a lawyer, the first of these problems is of foremost importance,
but of necessity the lawyer must also concern himself with the
second. The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the more
recent cases in an attempt to point to trends and indications of the
various aspects of the race problem.
The race problem is, of course, one of national aspect. At
the same time, the race problem in a more limited sense is a regional
problem. For this reason, we shal confine our search for the law
to the cases decided in the South, the region which is most inti-
mately embraced by the controversy.
Before we attempt to define the law, we must first define the
problem which necessitates the law. This is primarily of interest
to the sociologist. There is but one South. That is to say, it is
easy to trace throughout the region a fairly definite mental pattern,
associated with a fairly definite social pattern.2 These two patterns
may be best described as white supremacy. The reason for the
existence of the white supremacy mental and social patterns is
best described as the "vicious circle." White prejudice and dis-
crimination keep the Negro low in standards of living, health, edu-
cation, manners and morals. This, in its turn, gives support to White
prejudice.3 As can be readily determined, the interworking of this
"vicious circle" for generations has resulted in a complicated double
standard of social intercourse. This social situation along with the
fourteenth amendment thus present the legal problem.
This discussion of the legal aspects of the race problem will
be limited to eight phases: (1) inns and restaurants; (2) theaters
and places of amusement; (8) public conveyances; (4) places of
1 U.S. CoNsT., Amend. XIV, §11.
2W. F. CAsn,, THE MmD orm SouT (1941), p. viii.
3 Guimm M=IuAL, AN Amu c DmnmiA, (Harper & Bros 1944), pp.
75-78.
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business or public resort; (5) public schools; (6) constitution of
juries; (7) competency as witnesses; and (8) punishment of crime.
Some of the questions raised can be answered by citing pertinent
cases, but we must apply the principles of these cases to other situa-
tions by analogy.
1. INNS AND BETUrTS
It can safely be said that discrimination by private individuals
in privately owned inns and restaurants is not a denial of equal
protection of the laws. However, at the slightest trace of state
activity or control, we have a completely different situation. Thus,
in Derrington v. Plummet, where a county leased a cafeteria in a
newly constructed courthouse to a private tenant to operate, the
tenant's exclusion of persons merely because they were Negroes
constituted state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment.4
The fact that there was no purpose of discrimination on the part
of the county and no reservation of control under the terms of the
lease was held immaterial.
Turning to the other side of the picture, the refusal of the pro-
prietors of an ice cream and sandwich shop to serve Negroes in the
portion of the shop reserved for white clientele impaired no rights of
the Negroes under the fourteenth amendment.5 This decision was
reached despite the fact that the complaint, on which warrant of
arrest for violation of statutes imposing criminal penalties for inter-
fering with possession or right of possession of realty privately held,
was signed by the officer charged with the duty of enforcing the
laws, rather than by the proprietors of the shop. This was held not
to constitute state action.
The next problem is to determine what political subdivisions of
a state may, by their acts, deny equal protection of the laws. As
was seen in Derrington v. Plummet, supra, action by a county may
constitute state activity. From this, it logically follows that discrim-
ination by a city may constitute state action. In a recent Delaware
case,6 it was held that where a city parking authority, a public tax
exempt agency, leased space in its building for the operation of a
restaurant under an agreement requiring the tenant to comply with
4 Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956); Cert. denied
353 U.S. 924 (1957).
5 State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958).
6 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 150 A.2d 197 (Del. 1959).
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all applicable7 federal laws, the equal protection clause applied to
discriminatory practices by the tenant
In summary, the "equal protection of the laws" clause will not
operate to prevent discrimination by private individuals in privately
owned inns and restaurants. However, a slight tinge of state activity
will tip the balance and bring such practices within the province of
federal protection. It is interesting to speculate whether forced
nondiscriminatory practices on the part of private owners would con-
stitute a denial of equal protection of the law as to them.
2. TmATmEs AND PLAcEs oF AMUSmE=NT
In this area of the race problem, we once again must search for
state activity. The concept of individual discrimination not being
within the fourteenth amendment applies equally in all cases. For
this reason, we confine our discussion to those cases in which there
has been state action.
In an early case on the problem," the federal court held that the
city of Baltimore was under no legal obligation to provide golfing
facilities, but so long as it continues to do so, it must furnish sub-
stantially equivalent facilities to white and colored citizens. This
case seems to apply the "separate but equal" doctrine, but its import-
ance may have been weakened by subsequent case law. The later
case of Beal v. Holcombe9 required that Negroes be allowed to use
golfing facilities in parks reserved exclusively for the use of white
people. However, in that case the parks reserved for colored people
had no golf courses. No mention was made of the earlier case, and
it is entirely speculative whether or not the doctrine would apply
were the court confronted with a case where the facilities are sep-
arate but equal. A 1955 Virginia case 10 held that the "separate but
equal" doctrine had been abolished, not only with respect to schools,
beaches and bathhouses maintained by public authority, but also
-with respect to state parks. This language must be considered as
dictum because the court found as a matter of fact that the golfing
facilities furnished to Negroes were inferior to those furnished white
patrons. However, the weight of the earlier case is weakened.
7 Emphasis ours.
8Law v. City of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 846 (D.Md. 1948).9 Beal v. Holcombe, 198 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1951); Cert. denied 847 U.S.
974 (1954).
10 Tate v. Dep't. of Conservation & Development, 183 F. Supp. 58 (E.D.Va.
1955); affirmed 281 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956).
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Turning our attention to other recreational facilities, the Fed-
eral Court for the Southern District of West Virginia required a mu-
nicipality to operate a swimming pool constructed with public funds
under statutory authority without discrimination on account of race
or color." This requirement applied whether the city operated the
pool itself or leased it to a private citizen for operation. In connec-
tion with public swimming pools, there are no constitutional guar-
antees violated where the pool is closed or sold rather than to admit
Negroes.12
With respect to athletic contests, a statute prohibiting activities
in which the participants are members of the white or colored races
is in violation of equal protection.13 In that case, a boxing commis-
sion regulation adopted pursuant to the statute was the subject of
the court's attention and was held unconstitutional.
As far as can be determined, there are no cases questioning the
right to segregate the races in theaters and other public places of
amusement It would seem the question of private versus state
action would apply and be the decisive factor.
3. PUBuC CONVEYANCES
Surprisingly, there are very few recent cases dealing with seg-
gregation of the races on public conveyances. An early case held
such to be proper.14 However, the most recent case declared that
statutes and ordinances requiring segregation of white and colored
races on motor buses of a common carrier of passengers violated
both due process and equal protection.' 5 The presence of the stat-
utes in this case obviously shows state action. The only remaining
question in this field is whether voluntarily adherence to the custom
of racial segregation by a privately owned bus company would
constitute state action where the franchise rights are granted by the
state -public service commission or its equivalent. As far as can be
determined, this question remains unanswered.
4. PLACES OF BusiNEss On PUBuC RESORT
There are no cases found in point on this phase of our search
for the law. The most that can be sald is that cases from other
fields of the race controversy must be applied by analogy. The de-
ll Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.W.Va. 1948).
12 Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 162 F. Supp. 549 (M.D.N.C. 1958).
'3 Dorsey v. State Athletic Commission, 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.La. 1958).
14 Pridgen v. Carolina Coach Co., 229 N.C. 46, 47 S.E.2d 609 (1948).
15 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D.Ala. 1956).
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cisive component, were the case to arise, would again appear to be
the concept of state action. In the opinion of the writer, a trace of
state action would result in a denial of equal protection to those
required to segregate themselves. Voluntary discrimination by pri-
vate individuals would be followed by the opposite result.
5. PUMuc SCHooLs
Since the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education,16
there is no question that forced segregation of the races in public
schools is a denial of equal protection of the law. This result follows
whether the facilities are equal or unequal because the "separate
but equal" doctrine as applied to public schools was expressly held
unconstitutional. In the discussion which follows, we will look to
those recent cases dealing with attempts to avoid desegration of
public schools.
In the case arising from the Little Rock situation, the court
held a statute, allowing the governor to close schools and school dis-
tricts and call for an election as to whether schools in the district
should be integrated, to be unconstitutional. 17 A complementary
statute providing for withholding from a school district, in which the
governor has ordered a school closed, a prorata share of the state
funds, and making the same funds available on a per capita basis to
any other school which was attended by students of the closed
school was also invalid in that case.
The prohibition against segregation in public schools applies
equally to state institutions of higher learning.' 8 In the latter case,
one must admire the ingenuity displayed, despite the unworthy pur-
pose. The requirement that each student must submit certificates
from two citizens of Georgia, alumni of the institution he desires to
attend, which certify that each such alumnus is personally ac-
quainted with the applicant and the extent of such acquaintance,
the applicant is of good moral character, bears a good reputation in
the community in which he resides, and, in the opinion of the alum-
nus, is a fit and suitable person for admission and able to pursue
successfully the courses of study offered by the institution, was held
invalid because there were no Negro Alumni of the white colleges.
Thus, it was difficult, if not impossible, for Negroes to comply with
the requirement. The case also held that the scholarship program
16 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).1 7 Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.Ark. 1959).
Is Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847 (N.D.Ga. 1959).
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which aids Negro students to take graduate and professional work
offered at institutions of the University System of Georgia and at
other institutions which accept Negroes, either outside the state or
at private Negro institutions within the state, does not meet the re-
quirement of equal protection.
Turning to the various plans for desegregation, the provision of
the plan applicable to Delaware schools stating that whenever pos-
sible every pupil within the grades affected would have the choice
of attending the nearest school in the district in which he resided
or attending the school he would have attended prior to the effective
date of the desegregation order was considered unfair because those
students who lived in a Negro community might be precluded from
ever entering a white school. 19 This provision along with the pro-
vision. to desegregate on a grade-by-grade basis over a period of
twelve years, requiring in the first year, all Negro children to regis-
ter but not requiring white children to register, was stricken from
the plan.
The latest case converning integration of public schools held
that the Commonwealth of Virginia, having accepted and assumed
responsibility of maintaining and operating public schools, could not
act through one of its afficers to close one or more schools solely
because of assignment to, or enrollment or presence in, that school
of children of different races, and at the same time keep other public
schools throughout the state open on a segregated basis.20 Another
interesting aspect of this case is that the court stated that to deny
the right to attend public schools under these circumstances to white
children was a denial of equal protection as to them.
6. CONSTtTrn ON OF JURMS
Thie applicable law in this field is best stated by the Fifth Fed-
eral Circuit Court in Goldsby v. Harpole.21 In that case the court
laid down the doctrine that ".... the Federal Constitution does not
guarantee to the defendant in a state court a trial before a jury in
which his race is proportionately represented, nor a trial before a
jury composed in any part of members of his race, nor even a jury
trial at all, if other defendants are not accorded a jury trial, but it
does assure him of equal treatment under the law and, so long as the
19 Evans v. Buchanan, 172 F. Supp. 508 (D. Del. 1959).
20 James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 831 (E.D.Va. 1959).
21263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1959).
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state elects to accord jury trials, it must not systematically exclude
from jury service qualified persons of his race."
There are many cases holding that a criminal defendant is de-
nied equal protection of the law if he is indicted by a grand jury or
tried by a petit jury from which members of his race have been ex-
cluded because of their race.22
Thus far, our survey has been concerned only with criminal
prosecution, but by dicta the court in Goldsby v. Harpole, supra, in-
dicated the doctrine was applicable as well to civil cases.
As can be easily determined, each case must rest on its own facts
as to whether there is a systematic exclusion of members of the
colored race. However, proof of long-continued exclusion of Ne-
groes from jury service makes a strong prima facie case of denial of
equal protection of the law in the prosecution of a person of the
African race.23
7. CozEmcY As Wrmssms
Although local prejudice may affect the credibility of a Negro
witness, the fact that he is a Negro should not affect his competency.
We say "should not" because no reported cases are found in which
a Negro has been denied the right to testify because of his race.
Since a Negro defendant is denied equal protection, where members
of his race are excluded from jury service, it follows that there would
be equally strong reasons for so holding where a Negro is not per-
mitted to testify in his behalf. The converse is true, only as to the
party offering him as a witness, where a Negro is offered as a witness
against a Negro defendant Whether there would be a denial of any
constitutional right to the witness is a matter of speculation.
Considering the liberal trends announced by the courts in in-
terpreting the fourteenth amendment, it seems probable that any
incompetency as a witness solely because of race would meet with
failure.
8. PUNISMWMT OF CRIME
Application of a criminal statute so that it brings about, or re-
ults in, inequality of treatment to the two races is not justified.24
2 2 Washington v. State, 112 So.2d 179 (Ala. 1959); State v. Perry, 250
N.C. 119, 108 S.E.2d 447 (1959); Eubanks v. State, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).23 C oldsby v. Harpole, supra.
24 Dobbins v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 697, 96 S.E.2d 154 (1957).
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This doctrine seems to be so well established and so in accord with
the concepts of criminal law that it can be described as "black letter"
law.
An interesting sidelight on this problem is stated in a recent
Louisiana case.25 The court held that marriage is a status controlled
by the state, and criminal statutes prohibiting intermarriage or co-
habitation between persons of different races in no way violate the
equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. This,
of course is a state decision in a state court, and its finding will not
be binding on a federal court should the case come up for determ-
ination of the federal rule to be applied.
We end as we began with recognition of the fact that the prob-
lems herein presented are essentially legal and sociological. The
only safe observation to be made is that any practice or procedure
under sanction of state action resulting in inequality of treatment to
the Negro as compared to that applicable to the white citizen will
fall within present condemnations of the courts. But the words and
phrases, "equal protection," "inequality" and "state action," are not
precisely defined and may find varied applications and uses in the
years ahead. As Mr. Justice Story observed in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816), the Constitution "was not intended to
provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure
through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in
the inscrutable purposes of Providence."
J. F. W., Jr.
215 State v. Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So.2d 283 (1959).
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